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1. Introduction 
Social capital has received a lot of attention in sociology, economics, and management studies 
(Gao et al., 2019). In recent years, the importance of social capital has also been emphasized 
in the business ethics literature, with various studies exploring the association between social 
capital and the use of corporate resources (Gao et al., 2019), fair trade (Davies and Ryals, 
2010), responsible entrepreneurship (Fuller and Tian, 2006), the yields of municipal bonds (Li 
et al., 2018), microfinance performance (Postelnicu and Hermes, 2018), and the quality of 
financial reports (Jha, 2019). A common underlying idea in these studies is that social capital 
can enhance trustworthiness and propensity to honour obligations, and constrain unethical 
behaviour (Li et al., 2018; Gao et al., 2019; Jha, 2019). In this paper, we extend these studies 
by examining whether and how national differences in social capital and corporate ethical 
behaviour perceptions influence the use of collateral across countries.  
The history of collateral goes back many centuries, having its roots on pawnbroking, a 
common way of secured lending in ancient Greece, Rome, and the Chinese Buddhist 
monasteries during the 5th century. Nowadays, collateral is a frequently-used contractual 
feature in banking, aiming to reduce the risk of lending due to information asymmetry 
problems. For example, the Survey of Terms of Business Lending conducted by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System in May 2017 (released in August 2017) reveals that 
62.4% of the value of all commercial and industrial loans made by all banks in the U.S., 67.2% 
of the value of the corresponding loans made by domestic US banks, and 89% of the value of 
the loans made by small domestic banks was secured by collateral. Similarly, data from the 
latest Enterprise Survey of the World Bank show that 79% of the loans originated in 139 
developing countries required collateral. 
Despite the important role of collateral, there has been little empirical research on the 
determinants of collateralized borrowing in a cross-country context (Nguyen and Qian, 2012), 
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with existing studies focusing on country-level characteristics like credit market concentration 
and macroeconomic conditions (Jiménez  et al., 2006), creditor rights and legal origins (Qian 
and Strahan, 2007; Qi et al., 2011; Yaldiz Hanedar et al., 2014), rule of law, regulatory quality 
and depth of credit information (Nguyen and Qian, 2012). Therefore, these studies have 
neglected the role of the social environment, and in particular the social capital and ethical 
behaviour perceptions. However, these two country level attributes could alleviate concerns 
about moral hazard, one of the two main reasons for the use of collateral in the context of 
information asymmetry problems.1 For example, as discussed in Hasan et al. (2017a), existing 
evidence suggests that individuals in societies with higher levels of social capital are less likely 
to engage in opportunistic, self-serving behaviours. Therefore, banks could perceive social 
capital as a constraint to opportunistic firm behaviour in debt contracting, lowering their 
collateral requirements. Similarly, Kim et al. (2014) assert that business ethics may be an 
important element in contracting bank loans. The main argument is that an ethical borrower 
does not lie, cheat or steal and behaves honestly. Consequently, ethical borrowers are perceived 
as less risky and banks will not need to monitor such borrowers intensively to prevent their 
opportunistic behaviour. 
To our knowledge, there are only two studies that provide some preliminary evidence 
consistent with the above arguments. The first study by Hasan et al. (2017a) finds that banks 
are less likely to impose a collateral requirement in loans issued to firms headquartered in U.S. 
counties with higher levels of social capital. However, as their dataset is limited to the U.S., 
their results are not necessarily generalizable to countries with different institutional 
development and depth of credit information, and in particular developing countries like those 
that we examine in the present study. The second study, by Kim et al. (2014) uses a sample 
                                                 
1 Studies that relate the use of collateral with moral hazard are, among others, Boot and Thakor (1994), Boot et 
al. (1991), Rajan and Winton (1995). The second main reason for the use of collateral is adverse selection, as 
discussed in, among others, Bester (1985), Chan and Kanatas (1985), and Besanko and Thakor (1987). 
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from 19 countries to conclude that the ethical behaviour of firms leads to lower loan rates. 
While they mention that ethical borrowers are required to pledge lower collateral in comparison 
to non-ethical ones, they use collateral only as a control variable, and their observation is based 
on descriptive statistics and a t-test of mean value differences. Additionally, they focus on the 
syndicated loan market, where loans are typically extended from large multinational banks to 
large borrowers in both developed and developing countries. In contrast, the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Survey (WBES) that we use in the present study covers loans from various types of 
banking and non-banking institutions (microfinance institutions, credit cooperatives) extended 
not only to large, but also to small and medium enterprises in developing countries. 
 Our sample includes over 17,500 firms operating in more than 100 developing and 
transition countries during the period 2003-2017. This ensures a certain degree of 
heterogeneity, both in the use of collateral and the social environment. While our focus on 
developing countries is driven by the coverage in WBES, there are at least three reasons that 
make this an interesting exercise. First, information asymmetry problems can be more severe 
in developing countries, enhancing the request for collateral (Menkhoff et al., 2012; Yaldiz 
Hanedar et al., 2014). Second, the use of collateral widely varies among developing countries.2 
Third, our knowledge on the use of collateral comes mainly from developed markets like the 
U.S. and Europe, and there is considerably less evidence for developing countries (Menkhoff 
et al., 2012).  
Our results show that country-level social capital and better perceptions about corporate 
ethics have a negative effect on the likelihood to pledge collateral. Additionally, we find that 
social capital and ethical behaviour influence the value of the collateral (in relation to the value 
                                                 
2 For instance, according to WBES, the proportion of loans requiring collateral range from 23% in Brazil to 
100% in Guinea and Sudan. Data from the survey do not correspond to the same year for all countries. For 
example, the latest data for Brazil are from 2009, the ones for Guinea from 2016, and those for Sudan from 2014. 
However, the variation in the figures is not due to time differences. For example, in 2013, 28.9% of the loans in 
Turkey and 87% of the loans in Tunisia required collateral.  
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of the loan). These results are robust to the use of an array of firm and country-specific control 
variables, sub-samples, and the use of instrumental variable analysis that mitigates concerns 
regarding reverse causality and confounding effects.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses our hypotheses. 
Section 3 outlines the data, variables, and methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2. Hypotheses development  
2.1. Social Capital and Collateral 
Collateral is frequently used as a means to mitigate information asymmetry and moral hazard 
concerns. In our context, such concerns could be associated with opportunistic and self-serving 
firm actions that have the potential to favour firm shareholders at the expense of the lenders 
(Hasan et al., 2017a). However, the literature suggests several channels through which social 
capital can alter the decision-making of individuals that facilitate certain actions and constrain 
others. This is because people tend to conform to social norms that constrain opportunistic, 
self-serving behaviour and are associated with either internal (e.g. guilt) or external (e.g. shame 
and ostracism) sanctions (Elster, 1989; Coleman, 1990; Posner, 2000). Within this context, 
social networks play an important role in building trust (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000), and 
theoretical work by Karlan et al. (2009) asserts that network connections between individuals 
can be used as social collateral to secure informal borrowing. Along the same lines, Knack and 
Keefer (1997) argue that individuals in higher-trust societies spend less to protect themselves 
from being exploited in economic transactions, written contracts are less likely to be needed, 
and they do not have to specify every possible contingency.  
Social capital could also facilitate the flow and credibility of information, this being 
another channel through which it can mitigate moral hazard (Lin and Pursiainen, 2018). For 
instance, Uzzi (1996) highlights the role of social capital in the credibility of information, 
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mentioning that “Social relations make information credible and interpretable, imbuing it with 
qualities and value beyond what is at hand”. (p. 678), as well as that “If trust forms between 
two actors, a base for fine-grained information transfer is set in place. Such an exchange is 
unlikely in the absence of trust because information could be used opportunistically” (p. 681).   
At this point, it should be mentioned that one may also distinguish between various 
types of social capital, like bonding social capital, bridging social capital and linking social 
capital (Woolcock, 2001). Woolcock (2001) mentions that bonding refers to relations between 
family members, close friends, and neighbours, whereas bridging refers to more distant friends, 
associates, and colleagues. Bridging can be seen as a horizontal metaphor that implies 
connections between people who share broadly similar demographic characteristics. Finally, 
linking is being described as a vertical dimension that has to do with the establishment of 
alliances with sympathetic individuals in positions of power, and it is associated with the 
capacity to leverage resources, ideas, and information from formal institutions beyond the 
community. The Legatum Institute’s index of social capital that we use in the empirical part 
attempts to capture all three dimensions. Therefore, we discuss these types of social capital in 
more detail along with the Legatum Institute index in the next section. Turning to the empirical 
literature in finance, in general, the results confirm the effectiveness of social capital in 
imposing constrains on individuals, like strategic defaults on mortgages (Guiso et al., 2013) 
and moral hazard in the insurance market (Millo and Pasini, 2010). There is also evidence that 
firms in high social capital US counties are less prone to engage in corporate tax avoidance 
(Hasan et al, 2017b), and they obtain better credit terms (Hasan et al., 2017a), as well as that 
social capital in the country of entrepreneur matters for the campaign performance in the case 
of crowdfunding (Lin and Pursiainen, 2018). On the basis of the above discussion, we form 
our first hypothesis as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1: The country-level social capital will be negatively associated with the use of 
collateral.  
 
2.2. Ethical behaviour and Collateral 
In a discussion on the economics of ethics, Noreen (1988) mentions that while some people 
are unreservedly opportunistic, others constrain their own behaviour out of an ethical 
sensibility or conscience. He concludes that “if parties to a transaction believe that the other 
parties to the transaction are honest and act in good faith, the transaction may be possible 
where it would not have been possible and dead-weight losses can be avoided” (p. 368). Along 
the same lines, Weiss (2009) argues that “doing the right thing” matters to firms and their 
stakeholders, and he discusses various reasons for this. For example, acting legally and 
ethically may result in savings of billions of dollars each year in lawsuits, settlements and theft. 
Other costs of unethical behaviour include deterioration of relationships, damage to reputation, 
and declining employee productivity, creativity and loyalty. In general, as discussed in Bews 
and Rossouw (2002), ethics can play an important and vital role in facilitating trust. Such trust 
between the bank and the firm can be an important element in bank-firm relationships 
(Pasiouras et al., 2019) and access to credit (Moro and Fink, 2013), and it could result in better 
loan terms, like lower collateral requirements.  
Building on past studies, Key and Popkin (1998) also highlight that “Analysis of 
corporate failures and disasters strongly suggests that incorporating ethics in before-profit 
decision making can improve strategy development implementation and ultimately maximize 
corporate profits” (p. 331). Guiso et al. (2015) conclude that the employees’ perception for the 
trustworthiness and ethics of the top managers is positively associated with firm performance, 
while Kim et al. (2014) concludes that business ethics is an important element in contracting 
bank loans. Therefore, reflecting upon the above, we state our second hypothesis as follows: 
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Hypothesis 2: Firms located in countries with perceptions reflecting a more ethical corporate 
behaviour are less likely to pledge collateral. 
 
3. Data, Variables and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
The firm level data for the present study are obtained from the World Bank’s Enterprise 
Surveys (WBES).3 Some firms in the sample are included only once in the Surveys, whereas 
others may participate more than once. Our final working sample covers an unbalanced panel 
of over 17,500 firms operating in more than 100 transition and developing countries that 
obtained a loan over the period 2003 to 2017. 
Information on social capital is obtained from the Legatum Institute, whereas 
information on the perceived ethical behaviour of firms in each country is obtained from the 
executive opinion survey of the World Economic Forum. Data for the perceived ethical 
behaviour first became available in 2006, and data for social capital first became available in 
2007. Therefore, we had to work under the assumption that these variables do not change over 
the period 2003-2006 and 2003-2007, respectively. However, the values of these variables do 
not change much within very short time windows, like from one year to another.4 Thus, our 
approach should not raise important concerns.  
                                                 
3 The Enterprise Surveys implemented in European and Central Asian countries are also known as Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) and are jointly conducted by the World Bank Group, 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the 
European Commission (EC). Enterprise Surveys in Latin America are jointly funded with the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB). Enterprise Surveys in the Middle East and North Africa are jointly funded with EBRD 
and the EIB. These Surveys were initiated in 2002 and they cover firm-specific attributes and a broad range of 
business environment topics. For most countries, an Enterprise Survey is conducted about every 3-4 years. While 
the surveys were initially conducted by different units within the World Bank, since 2005-06 most data collection 
efforts have been centralized within the Enterprise Analysis Unit. This resulted in a unified set of core survey 
questions and a consistent application of survey methodology across countries. Therefore, to ensure consistency 
the present study uses data from these standardized surveys in the post 2005-2006 period. 
4 To give some examples, in the case of SOCIAL the figures are as follows: Ethiopia = 42.19 (2007), 42.19 
(2008), 42.19 (2009), 42.37 (2010), 42.37 (2011); Jamaica = 50.33 (2007), 50.33 (2008), 50.33 (2009), 50.33 
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Data for the control variables are collected from various databases of the World Bank. 
More precisely, data on the depth of credit information are from the Doing Business project. 
Information on GDP per capita is from the World Development Indicators database. Country-
level aggregated banking sector indicators are from the Global Financial Development 
Database. Information on institutional development is from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators project. Information on national culture is from Hofstede Insights. These are detailed 
further in the following section. 
 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Dependent variable 
To construct our dependent variable (COLLATERAL), we rely on the answer to the following 
question in the WBES: “Referring only to this most recent loan or line of credit, did the 
financing require collateral?” We assign the value of one to firms that answer yes 
(COLLATERAL =1) and the value of zero otherwise. Therefore, our dummy variable denotes 
whether firms have pledged collateral to obtain a loan or not.  
 
3.2.2. Social capital and Corporate Ethical Behaviour 
The social capital index (SOCIAL) that we use is obtained from the Legatum Institute, and it 
is an aggregate index that is based on three dimensions: (i) Personal and Social Relationships, 
(ii) Social Norms, and (iii) Civic Participation.  
                                                 
(2010), 50.02 (2011); Chile = 53.94 (2007), 53.63 (2008), 52.24 (2009), 52.52 (2010), 53.52 (2011); Panama = 
54.78 (2007), 55.16 (2008), 53.59 (2009), 52.60 (2010), 53.27 (2011). The corresponding figures in the case of 
ETHICS are as follows: Ethiopia = 3.81 (2007), 3.83 (2008), 3.65 (2009), 3.94 (2010), 3.92 (2011); Jamaica = 
3.98 (2007), 3.82 (2008), 3.88 (2009), 3.95 (2010), 3.89 (2011), Chile = 5.46 (2007), 5.34 (2008), 5.47 (2009), 
5.56 (2010), 5.54 (2011); Panama = 4.35 (2007), 4.19 (2008), 4.02 (2009), 4.15 (2010), 4.13 (2011). Other 
countries follow similar patterns.  
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The first dimension measures the strength of bonding social capital in the form of 
personal relationships, family networks and genuine community. The indicators used by 
Legatum for the estimation of this dimension are based on a survey, and they reflect the 
perceived level of opportunity to make friends, the ability to count on family/friends for help, 
the frequency of helping strangers, and the frequency of giving informal financial help. This 
dimension can influence the use of collateral through various ways. For example, Lee and 
Persson (2016) highlight that financing from family and friends accounts for the majority of 
informal finance in both developed and developing countries. This availability of informal 
financial help can become a tangible asset (money) at request, if needed.  In other words, if the 
entrepreneur is not in position to make a repayment of the loan, family and friends might step 
in and help with the repayment. This will result in a lower expected default likelihood and 
better loan terms. Further to this, the willingness of family and friends to provide support will 
not necessarily be limited to economic resources. As discussed in Cofré-Bravo et al. (2019), 
these network members can also provide labour and emotional support, they can become a 
source of experience and support in solving problems, and they can connect the firm with other 
actors (e.g. export firms, input providers, governmental agencies). Thus, the expectation that 
members of the firm’s network can provide help in various ways is a form of an intangible 
asset that could result in lower collateral requirements. Finally, the opportunity to make friends 
and maintain an enhanced network may influence directly or indirectly the formation of a close 
firm-bank relationship. For example, a social bond between the banker and the borrower can 
be developed through interpersonal relationships, the exchange of nonprofessional information 
and the participation in local life (Ferrary, 2003). Additionally, the banker can obtain 
information indirectly through his or her relationships with members of the network (Ferrary, 
2003). These aspects can play an import role in the light of recent evidence indicating that 
personal relationships between the loan officers and firm executives affect the financial 
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constraints of the firms (Anderson et al., 2018), and benefit firms across loan terms (Karolyi, 
2018). 
The second dimension is a measure of bridging social capital that is manifested in civic 
norms, social cohesion and engagement. It is based on two survey variables that reflect the 
trust in institutions, and the level of respect with which people treat each other. This dimension 
relates to the social capital view arguing that cross-country variations in interpersonal and 
institutional trust influences perceptions on the likelihood or ability of counter parties in 
business to act opportunistically (Dowling et al., 2019). For example, Postelnicu et al. (2019) 
conclude that the risk of losing external social ties increases the willingness to repay loans, 
suggesting that such ties could serve as a substitute for collateral. Furthermore, high levels of 
bridging capital facilitate the smooth function of the economy as they represent the level of 
trust required for institutions and legal systems to prosper (Legatum Institute, 2017). This is 
particularly important because well-developed formal institutions enhance monitoring, 
reducing the risk of unfair and opportunistic behaviour in financial transactions, and they can 
result in lower collateral requirements (Nguyen and Qian, 2012; Dowling et al., 2019). For 
example, institutional trust may influence owner-manager beliefs for the other party’s 
cooperative behaviour, due to confidence in the institutional mechanisms imposing sanctions 
and controlling the exchanges (Dowling et al., 2019). Therefore, bridging capital may work as 
a substitute or complement to formal institutions. As it concerns the level of respect, bridging 
social capital refers -in general- to weak ties between extra-community networks and 
heterogeneous groups, and it could result in the provision of various resources like contact 
points to meet other stakeholders, connection with other networks and organizations, advisory 
services, source of new ideas, access to information that would otherwise be unavailable or 
costly to locate etc. (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Cofré-Bravo et al., 2019). These types of 
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relations are often formed on a voluntary basis and require substantial levels of respect and 
trust between the different parties. 
The last dimension is a measure of the linking social capital, reflecting the civic and 
political participation of a citizenry. To capture this dimension, Legatum uses the following 
indicators: frequency of donations to charity, the frequency of volunteering, the frequency of 
voicing opinion to a public official, and voter turnout. Therefore, this dimension also relates to 
the social altruism index of Knack (1992) that was created from questions about charity, 
volunteer work, and community involvement in the 1991 National Election Pilot Study and 
was subsequently found to be positively associated to turnout. In their study of debt contracting 
in the US, Hasan et al. (2017a) also consider the proportion of eligible voters who actually 
voted in the construction of a social index. Lee and Persson (2016) also mention that the quality 
of the (altruistic) relationship serves as “social” collateral. Additionally, Hasan et al. (2017a) 
highlight several studies which argue that since there are no legal or economic incentives to 
vote or to take census surveys, data on voter turnout and census response rate capture the 
ramifications of social norms that emphasize cooperative behaviours (e.g. Guiso et al., 2004, 
2010; Funk, 2010; Knack, 2002). The frequency of donations and volunteering also reflect the 
bonds of trust and reciprocity created in social networks. All these could play an important role 
in the use of collateral as they foster strong cooperative norms, which in turn limit opportunistic 
and unethical corporate behaviour (Gao et al., 2019).  
To account for the perceived ethical behaviour of firms (ETHICS), we consider the 
answer to the following question from the Executive Opinion Survey of the World Economic 
Forum (WEF): “In your country, how do you rate the corporate ethics of companies (Ethical 
behaviour in interactions with public officials, politicians, and other firms)?” The answer to 
this question may range from 1 to 7, with higher figures indicating higher ethical behaviour 
and vice versa. WEF then aggregates the individual answers to an overall country indicator by 
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averaging the responses, acting as a typical evaluation of perceptions about a country’s ethical 
corporate behaviour.  
 
3.2.3. Control Variables 
MED_SIZE and LARGE_SIZE are dummy variables that control for firm size. 
MED_SIZE takes the value of one in the case of medium enterprises and the value of zero 
otherwise. LARGE_SIZE takes the value of one in the case of large enterprises and the value 
of zero otherwise. Small and micro enterprises form the omitted group captured by the 
constant.5 While the existing literature reveals that size may play a role on the use of collateral, 
it is inconclusive as for the direction of its impact. This is because smaller firms can be 
informal, more opaque and less reputable, associated with a higher likelihood of collateralized 
borrowing. In contrast, small firms may lack adequate collateral, and therefore rely more on 
reputation and personal relationships as substitutes to collateral (Nguyen and Qian, 2012). 
AGE is calculated as the difference between the year of the loan and the year of the 
firm’s establishment, and controls for firm age. The literature suggests that older firms are less 
likely to have to provide collateral (Nguyen and Qian, 2012; Dias Duarte et al., 2017; Meles et 
al., 2017).  
ISO_CERTIFY is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in the case of firms 
with an internationally-recognized quality certification (e.g. ISO 9000, ISO 9002), and the 
value of zero otherwise. The literature suggests that certifications result in lower collateral 
requirements, possibly due to higher repayment capability (Nguyen and Qian, 2012; Duarte et 
al., 2017).  
                                                 
5 Micro firms represent only 0.53% of the firms in the dataset. Therefore, we group them together with small firms 
and we refer to them as small and micro enterprises.  
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EXPERIENCE captures the years of working experience of the firm’s top manager in 
the sector. It aims to control for expectations that more experienced managers can achieve 
higher performance and have good relationships with lending institutions, thereby reducing the 
need for collateral (Nguyen and Qian, 2012; Dias Duarte et al., 2017). 
CRINFO is a country-level index of the depth of credit information, with higher values 
indicating the availability of more information. Taken from the World Bank Doing Business 
project, it measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit 
information available through either a credit bureau or a credit registry. Therefore, we expect 
it to be negatively associated with the requirement of collateral (Nguyen and Qian, 2012; 
Yaldiz Hanedar et al., 2014; Dias Duarte et al., 2017). 
GDPCAP is the GDP per capita in a country, serving as a control for country-level 
overall economic development (Nguyen and Qian, 2012; Yaldiz Hanedar et al., 2014; Dias 
Duarte et al., 2017). 
 
3.2.4. Methodology 
Considering the binary nature of the dependent variable, we use a logistic regression model of 
the following form:6 
 
 
Where F(x) is the sigmoid function  
1
1+𝑒−𝑥
, index i denotes firms, k refers to countries and t is 
the temporal index. ‘Collateral’ is the dummy variable revealing whether the firm pledged 
                                                 
6 Our approach is consistent with many other studies on the use of collateral that employ Logit/Probit models, like 
among others, Elsas and Krahnen (2002), Jiménez et al. (2006, 2009), Chakraborty and Hu (2006), Berger et al. 
(2011), Meles et al. (2017). We also estimate eq. (1) as a linear probability model through the use of OLS, or a 
fractional response model (to constrain the feasible dependent values to the [0,1] range). The results remain intact 
and they are available upon request. 
(1) 
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collateral or not. ‘Social Environment’ is the variable of interest and denotes either a country’s 
social capital (SOCIAL) or its perception about ethical corporate behaviour (ETHICS). ‘Firm’ 
is a vector of firm-level covariates, and ‘Country’ is a vector of country-level covariates 
discussed above.  Additionally, all regressions include time (‘Year’) and industry (‘Sector’) 
dummies to capture the temporal and sectoral heterogeneity. Finally, ‘Origin’ refers to a set of 
dummy variables for the geographical regions of origin, distinguishing between Sub-Saharan 
Africa (omitted group dummy captured by the constant), East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central 
Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa, South Asia.  
One well-known issue with the use of fixed effects is that time-invariant variables 
cannot be included in the estimations, and slowly moving variables will usually have high 
standard errors because they will be highly co-linear with the fixed effects (Beck and Katz, 
2001). In our case, as discussed earlier in section 3.1, the two main variables of interest 
(SOCIAL and ETHICS) are not time-invariant, but they change very slowly over relatively 
short time periods (e.g. from one year to another) within countries. In other words, they are 
“sluggish” variables. As discussed in Beck (2001), while one can estimate a specification with 
fixed effects and sluggish variables, the fixed effects will soak up most of the explanatory 
power of those slowly changing variables. In other words, as Beck (2001) highlights “Thus, if 
a variable […] changes over time, but slowly, the fixed effects will make it hard for such 
variables to appear either substantively or statistically significant (Beck and Katz, 2001)” (p. 
285). Furthermore, the use of fixed effects would imply that our interest lies only on whether 
the small part of the independent variable that is temporally unstable explains the dependent 
variable (Beck and Katz, 2001). Therefore, since we cannot introduce country fixed effects into 




4. Empirical Results  
4.1. Main results 
Table 1 presents the correlation coefficients and Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of our 
baseline model. Overall, it seems that around 73% of the firms provided collateral to receive 
bank loans. Around 26% are large firms, 38% are medium and 36% are small. The average 
firm has been operating for 21 years at the time of requesting a loan, while the average manager 
had an experience of just over 20 years in her/his career. As far as the variables of interest are 
concerned, the aggregate index of social capital is on average at 47.70 (out of 100) across the 
countries and time period in our sample, while the same figure regarding the perception of 
ethical corporate behaviour stands at 3.82 (out of 7).  
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 Around Here] 
 
The estimations of the logit model presented in Table 3 provide support to the two hypotheses 
stated in Section 2. Columns 1 and 7 correspond to the baseline model described in Section 
3.2.4. Seemingly, country-level social capital and better perceptions about corporate ethical 
behaviour are negatively associated with the likelihood to pledge collateral. To be more 
informative about the economic significance, Table 3 presents the odds ratios, where a ratio 
higher (lower) than 1 describes a positive (negative) relationship between variables. Thus, the 
figures in Column 1 reveal that for every unit increase in SOCIAL the odds of pledging (versus 
non-pledging) collateral are 0.973 times lower (Column 1), given that the other variables in the 
model are held constant. Consequently, and to give an example, the odds of pledging collateral 
for a firm operating in Uruguay in 2016 (𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿𝑈𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑦,2016 = 57.70) were 9.4 times lower 
than those of a firm operating in El Salvador (𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟,2016 48.04) the same year. 
Similarly, with an odds ratio of 0.748 in the case of ETHICS (Column 7), the odds of pledging 
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collateral for a firm operating in Tunisia (ETHICS value of 5.06) are 1.03 times lower than the 
ones of a firm operating in Ecuador (ETHICS value of 3.76). These results complement the 
findings of Hasan et al. (2017a) who conclude that banks provide loans at a lower interest rate 
and with less stringent terms to firms headquartered in U.S. counties with higher levels of social 
capital.  Broadly speaking, they also provide support to various studies that go beyond bank 
lending and support the view that firms from high-social-capital U.S. counties behave less 
opportunistic either in terms of tax avoidance (Hasan et al., 2017b), or earnings management 
(Jha, 2019). In a more general context, our findings also provide support to cross-country 
studies and theoretical work that refer to pressures from the environment, and firm actions to 
fit within this environment and meet expectations. For example, as discussed in Goodstein 
(1994), organizations must respond to pressures and demands associated with regulations, 
norms, laws and social expectations. In our case, it seems that firms that operate in countries 
with better perfections about corporate ethical behaviour and higher social capital behave in a 
way that conforms to the expectations of their social peers in the communities and restrain 
opportunistic behaviour. Bank managers consider this intangible asset and lower their collateral 
requirements. The latter also relates to the theoretical and empirical work of Karlan et al. 
(2009), who illustrate the value of network connections as a means of social collateral in the 
case of informal borrowing in Peru.  
 
 [Insert Table 3 Around Here] 
 
In columns (2) to (5) and (8) to (11) we use additional information from the WBES 
dataset to control for another four firm-specific characteristics. First, following Dias Duarte et 
al. (2017) and Nguyen and Qian (2012) we control for financial openness (FINOP). This 
variable may take the value of zero in the case of firms with no checking/savings account or 
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overdraft, the value of one in the case of firms that have either checking/savings account or 
overdraft, and the value of two in the case where a firm has both checking/savings account and 
an overdraft facility. Second, as in Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) and Dias Duarte et al. 
(2017), we control for trade credit (TRCREDIT) using the percentage of the material inputs or 
services that were paid after delivery. This should provide some information about the 
creditworthiness of the company, since the suppliers consider the probability of loss due to a 
buyer's failure to make payments on any type of debt when they provide trade credits to their 
buyers (Lou and Wang, 2013; Tsao, 2019). Third, we use a dummy variable that indicates 
whether there are females among the owners of the firm (FEMALE) to account for potential 
differences in collateral pledging between women-owned firms and men-owned ones (Riding 
and Swift, 1990; Coleman, 2000). Fourth, we include the ratio of labour cost to annual sales, 
which reveals the efficiency of labour in generating revenue and serves as an indicator of cost 
management (LCOST). Columns (6) and (12) of Table 3 present the results when we control 
simultaneously for all the variables. The inclusion of these four firm-specific attributes in the 
regressions does not influence our main findings.7   
In Table 4 we control for banking sector concentration, country-level institutional 
environment, and national culture. The inclusion of these variables in the regressions does not 
alter the main findings of Table 3. In the discussion that follows we provide more details about 
these variables, and the rationale for their inclusion in the regressions. 
 
                                                 
7 In unreported regressions we include one by one in the baseline regression (Column 1 and 7 of Table 3) another 
two variables. The first is the ratio of total annual sales to the number of full-time employees that serves as a 
measure of labour productivity. The second is an indicator that shows whether the sales of main product 
increase/remain the same/decrease in the last fiscal year. Given that we do not have information on the actual 
value of sales, we include this indicator either a set of dummy variables to distinguish between the three potential 
outcomes or as an index that takes the values of -1 (decrease), 0 (no change), 1 (increase). This does not influence 
the results. In all the cases, the main results hold. We do not include these variables simultaneously with the other 
firm-level control variables in the regressions because this reduces substantially the sample to 121 observations 
in the case of SOCIAL and 115 observations in the case of ETHICAL. The estimations are available from the 
authors upon request.   
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[Insert Table 4 Around Here] 
 
To control for concentration, we use the proportion of assets held by the three largest 
commercial banks in a country (CONC). Higher figures indicate that only a few banks 
dominate in the market, and hence there is a lower degree of competition. The use of CONC is 
motivated by recent theoretical and empirical work that reveals a negative association between 
the use of collateral and bank competition (Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006; Hainz et al., 
2013).   
As a proxy for institutional environment (INSTIT) we use an overall enforcement index 
proposed by Li et al. (2006). We calculate INSTIT as the average of the following three 
indicators from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators project: regulatory 
quality, rule of law, control of corruption. Higher figures denote better outcomes. This index 
aims to control for the likelihood of a better legal and regulatory environment, allowing better 
contract monitoring and enforcement and hence lower need for collateral (Nguyen and Qian, 
2012).  
Turning to national culture, we use four dimensions that have been used in past studies 
that relate to access to finance and risk-taking (Aggarwal and Goodell, 2014, Li et al., 2013; 
Kreiser et al., 2010; Mihet, 2012). These are: an index of individualism (INDIV), an 
uncertainty avoidance index (UAI), an index of masculinity (MASC), and a power distance 
index (PDI). 
INDIV reveals the extent to which people’s self-image in the society is defined in terms 
of “I” or “we.” This national culture dimension could influence the request for collateral in 
various ways. On the one hand, individualism has been associated with overconfidence (Chui 
et al., 2010; Ferris et al., 2013) that could lead, for example, to more efficient research and 
development and a higher number of patents (Shao et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2017). Under this 
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scenario, due to the intrinsic firm value originating from overconfidence, individualism could 
be negatively associated to the likelihood of collateral use. On the other hand, managerial 
overconfidence can lead to corporate investment distortions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), and 
firms led by overconfident CEOs may be less responsive to corrective feedback in improving 
management forecast accuracy (Chen et al., 2015). Further to this, the literature also suggests 
that individualism is positively related to corporate risk-taking (Mihet, 2012; Li et al., 2013), 
and mortgage default rate (Tajaddini and Gholipour, 2017). Under this scenario, we would 
expect individualism to lead to higher collateral requirements, due to either higher risk-taking 
or firm value distortions.  UAI is defined as “the extent to which a culture programs its 
members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations” (Hofstede 
2001, p.19). Aggarwal and Goodell (2014) conclude that uncertainty avoidance has a negative 
impact on access to finance, while Hofstede et al. (2010) point out that when it comes to 
financial matters, people from high uncertainty avoidance countries have more worries about 
money and they take fewer risks. The literature shows that this applies to firms also, 
documenting that firms take lower risks in countries with a higher uncertainty avoidance 
culture (Kreiser et al., 2010; Li et al., 2013; Gaganis et al., 2019). Therefore, we control for 
this cultural dimension under the assumption that, in countries characterized by higher 
uncertainty avoidance, firms will not take excessive risks, and lenders will feel (on average) 
more confident that their loans are secured without the need for collateral. 
According to Hofstede et al. (2010) “a society is called masculine when emotional 
gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on 
material success, whereas women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with 
the quality of life” (p. 140). As a result, organizations in masculine societies stress results and 
try to reward achievement according to performance (Hofstede et al., 2010). Both Kreiser et 
al. (2010) and Mihet (2012) argue that this could encourage higher managerial risk-taking 
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behaviour. Therefore, we would expect that higher masculinity in a society is associated with 
higher requirements for collateral.  However, the empirical results of the aforementioned 
studies do not provide strong support to the masculinity risk-taking relationship. In more detail, 
while Mihet (2012) finds some evidence to support this argument, this is not robust across all 
the specifications. Furthermore, Kresier et al. (2010) and Li et al. (2013) find no evidence of 
statistically significant association between masculinity and risk-taking. In contrast, others 
report that a culture of masculinity results in corporations with larger cash and other liquid 
balances (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009), and lower debt (Wang and Esqueda, 2014). As both 
higher liquidity and lower leverage would be perceived as positive signals from the perspective 
of banks, these findings point to a negative association between a culture of masculinity and 
collateral requirements.    
PDI reveals “the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and 
organizations within a country expect and that power is distributed unequally” (Hofstede et al., 
2010, p.61).  At the organizational level, a culture of power distance is associated with 
unlimited power for managers over their subordinates, autocratical decisions made by a few at 
the top, vertical communication, employees that expect decisions and instructions from their 
superiors (Ghosh, 2011). The literature provides conflicting results as for the impact of PDI on 
risk-taking. On the one hand, Kreiser et al. (2010) outline that: (i) managers in low power 
distance cultures will be much more willing to follow risky offensive strategies, while 
managers in high power distance ones will be more likely to adopt “fortify-and-defend” 
strategies that solidify their current position in the industry; (ii) organizations in power distance 
cultures tend to maintain tight control mechanisms and implement hierarchical bureaucratic 
structures. Their empirical results show that power distance is negatively associated with firm 
risk-taking, a finding that is confirmed by Mihet (2012). Under this scenario we would expect 
PDI it to be negatively associated with collateral requirements. However, others point to a 
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positive association between power and risk, that could translate in higher collateral 
requirements. For example, Anderson and Galinsky (2006) refer to the Approach/Inhibition 
Theory and propose that possessing power increases people’s risk appetite. In more detail, they 
argue that: (i) powerful people with a more active behavioral approach system should attend 
more to reward-laden information, and therefore when given the choice to engage in a risky 
course of action they should focus more on the potential payoffs of that risk; (ii) powerful 
people with a less active behavioral inhibition system should attend less the potential dangers 
inherent in that risk. Overall, it seems that focusing on rewards and being less aware of dangers 
should drive powerful people towards higher risk-taking. Díez-Esteban et al. (2019) show that 
this extends to national culture as well, reporting that firms in countries with high scores of 
power distance tend to increase risk taking. 
 
[Insert Table 4 Around Here] 
 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 present further estimations of the baseline specification 
by excluding the years of the crisis from the analysis. Even though inclusion of year dummies 
in our baseline specification controls for average temporal effects, excluding the years of the 
crisis (2007-2010) in particular ensures that the results are not driven by that turbulent period 
during which the requirements for collateral might be higher. Restricting the sample in this 
way does not influence the results, with the odds ratios being qualitatively similar to the ones 
presented in Table 3.   Columns (3) to (8) present separate regressions for small and micro, 
medium and large firms (Yaldiz Hanedar et al., 2014), allowing us to examine if the impact of 
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SOCIAL and ETHICS on collateral varies by size.8 We find that SOCIAL and ETHICS 
continue to have a negative impact on the likelihood to pledge collateral regardless of firm size.  
 The analysis presented in earlier estimations includes loans granted from private banks, 
state owned/government agencies and non-bank financial institutions. Nonetheless, collateral 
requirements might vary across different types of credit institutions (Nguyen and Qian, 2012). 
Therefore, in columns (9) and (10) we present the estimations while restricting our sample to 
loans from private banks, representing approximately 85.4% of the sample. Our key findings 
hold. 
 
[Insert Table 5 Around Here] 
 
4.2. Collateral value 
As a further exercise, we turn our attention to the value of the collateral expressed as a 
percentage of the loan value (COLVAL). Information for COLVAL is obtained from the 
answer to the following question in the WBES: “Referring only to this most recent line of credit 
or loan what was the approximate value of the collateral required as a percentage of the loan 
value?”. Given that the dependent variable is truncated at zero (left-censored), we estimate a 
Tobit model, following Elsas and Krahnen (2002) and Yaldiz Hanedar et al. (2014). The results 
are presented in Table 6. We consider all firms regardless of whether they pledge collateral or 
not. In particular, for firms that do not pledge collateral, COLVAL takes the value of zero. 
Complementing the previous results about the likelihood to pledge collateral, we now find that 
both SOCIAL and ETHICS lower the value of collateral asked to be pledged by firms. In 
                                                 
8 The regressions presented earlier control for size; however, the inclusion of size as a control variable does not 
allow us to examine whether the coefficients of the variables of interest (i.e. SOCIAL, ETHICS) vary by firm 
size. 
 24 
unreported regressions, we confirm that these results hold even with the use of OLS instead of 
a Tobit model.  
  
   [Insert Table 6 Around Here] 
 
4.3. Endogeneity 
One may argue that the results presented so far are clouded by endogeneity. Reverse 
causality should not be a concern in our context since it is difficult to argue that the collateral-
related policies of individual banks and firms influence a country’s social capital or perceptions 
of corporate ethical behaviour. However, one could still claim that endogeneity is present due 
to omitted variable bias. Therefore, while having controlled for various firm and country-level 
characteristics (including national culture, formal institutions, and geographical regions), we 
turn to instrumental variables regressions as a more formal way to address endogeneity 
concerns. Within this context, due to the binary and non-linear nature of our regression model 
(equation 1), we rely on a Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) regression system (Terza et 
al., 2008). In the first stage, our endogenous variable (SOCIAL or ETHICS in equation 1) is 
regressed on our instruments and exogenous variables of equation (1). Subsequently, in the 
second stage, we use the residuals of the first stage as an additional regressor in equation (1). 
We resort on three instruments that we expect to correlate with the first stage dependent 
variables, but not with the second stage error term. In the discussion that follows, we briefly 
outline the relationship between these instruments and the two variables of interest (i.e. 
SOCIAL and ETHICS).9  
                                                 
9 In unreported regressions we use two alternative instruments commonly employed in the literature. The first is 
religion, captured by the percentages of a country’s populations being Catholics, Muslims, and Protestants, those 
being the three most widely spread religions in the world in 1980s. The second is colonization, captured by dummy 
variables that distinguish between British colonies, Latin colonies, and colonies of others (e.g. China, Turkey, 
Germany). The results hold and all the estimations are available from the authors upon request.  
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The first instrument that we use is the ancestry adjusted predicted genetic diversity, 
estimated on the basis of migratory distance from East Africa in the study of Ashraf and Galor 
(2013). The underlying idea is that during human evolution there must have been many 
transitional patterns of behaviour (Lasker and Crews, 1996). For example, Baker et al. (2006) 
summarize the following lines of research that provide evidence for a genetic basis of antisocial 
behaviour: (i) behavioural genetic studies of twins and adoptees have demonstrated that 
heredity plays a role in antisocial behaviour, including various forms of aggression and 
criminality, (ii) various aspects of antisocial behaviour, including personality factors like 
impulsivity, sensation-seeking, risk-taking, and callous-unemotional traits, are at least partly 
genetically driven, (iii) psychiatric outcomes show that antisocial behaviour, including 
personality disorder, gambling, and substance use and abuse, is influenced by genetics.  Further 
to this, behavioural genetics studies show that measures of behaviour, depression, anxiety and 
personality are typically 30–50% heritable (Bouchard and Loehlin, 2001; Polderman et al., 
2015). Turning to cooperative behaviour, the results of Cesarini (2008) suggest that human 
genetic variation influences the decision to invest and to reciprocate investment in the classic 
trust game. Additionally, Wootton et al. (2016) report broad sense heritability estimates of 57% 
for generalized trust and 51% for trust in friends. Finally, recent cross-country empirical studies 
document that genetic diversity in the population is related to lower level of interpersonal trust 
(Arbatli et al., 2019) and corruption (Kunieda et al., 2016). To sum up, it seems that parents 
transmit behavioural patterns together with genes to their offspring, making genetic diversity 
a suitable instrument for social capital and ethical behaviour.   
The second instrument that we use is latitude, measured as the (absolute) value of the 
latitudinal distance from equator. Following Hall and Jones (1996), among others, we use this 
as a rough indicator of climate. Geographic latitude has been used for instance as an instrument 
of social capital in the studies of Folland (2007), Lee and Law (2017), Xiong et al. (2017). As 
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discussed in Xiong et al. (2017), citizens in high latitude areas are in general forced to trust 
each other to survive harsh weather. In contrast trade has in general been more developed in 
coastal regions (low latitude) and citizens may be more open-minded towards strangers. Gupta 
and Hanges (2004) also mention that physical climate in a region can influence the goals of 
people living in that region, and they highlight that the physical climate hypothesis has been 
nearly as popular for explaining societal behaviours as the competing hypotheses of religion 
and history-shaped institutions. As an example, they refer to Huntington (1915) and 
Montesquieu (1748/1989). The first supported the so-called climate hypothesis, arguing that 
most of the variance in social and economic behaviours can be explained in terms of the 
differences in physical climates. Along the same lines, the second articulated how physical 
climate shapes various sociocultural behaviour, including work ethic. 
The third instrument that we use is the agricultural potential, measured by the mean 
potential caloric yield attainable given the set of crops that were suitable for cultivation in the 
post-1500 period (Galor and Ozak, 2016).  Meggers (1954) argues that in places that are unfit 
for agriculture, subsistence derived from hunting, fishing and gathering will normally support 
only small groups that must be constantly on the move. As a result, social organization is 
largely based on kinship lines, with the social unit being a single family or, at best, an extended 
family or lineage. Hofstede et al. (2010) mention that farmers had to collaborate in 
monotonous, season-bound work, and they lived in much greater numbers than hunter-
gatherers or herders. This required a certain meekness, possibly related to higher social 
cooperation. Along the same lines, Ashkanasy et al. (2004) refer to the work of Ouchi (1981), 
mentioning that due to low suitability for agriculture in Japan, the planning and harvesting of 
rice can only be achieved with the cooperation of twenty or more people. Therefore, the 
Japanese had to learn to work together in harmony, and this explains the societal value that 
individual considerations are outweighed by concerns for group welfare. On top of that, 
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Hofstede et al. (2010) mention that the possession of storable food that could pass from one 
person to another in agricultural societies led to inheritance. Also, it led to unethical behaviour 
in the form of large-scale theft, that became an important concern, possibly for the first time in 
human history. To avoid widespread theft, there should be trust within the groups, followed by 
heavy sanctions against offenders (Hofstede et al., 2010). Finally, Gaganis et al. (2019) also 
use agricultural potential as an instrument for trust, while Litina (2016) empirically documents 
that lower level of land productivity in the past is associated with higher levels of current social 
capital, measured by generalized trust.  
The re-estimation of the baseline specifications in Table 3 (Columns 1 and 7) with the 
instrumental approach of Terza et al. (2008) are given in Table 7, providing support to our 
main finding, i.e. that there exists a casual effect of SOCIAL and ETHICS on the use of 
collateral. Apparently, our approach cannot rule out all endogeneity concerns; however, it 
should lessen major concerns. Let us note here that the 2SRI specification is just a variant of 
Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1993) suggestion of an augmented regression test (often known 
as Durbin-Wu-Hausman test), according to which a statistically significant coefficient for the 
residuals of the auxiliary regression included in the second stage means that the estimators of 
the variables of interest are not consistent on their own, thus suggesting endogeneity. This is 
confirmed as residuals of both variables of interest (i.e. 𝜀SOCIAL and 𝜀ETHICS) appear to be 
statistically significant. Moreover, aside from the conceptual justification of the instruments 
given in this section, statistical justification is also present, with all instruments being 
statistically significant and the significance of the first -auxiliary- stage overall model validated 
(F-statistic). It should be mentioned at this point that, because of the non-linear setting of eq. 
(1), we cannot obtain diagnostics such as under, weak or over-identification tests. Regardless, 
if we estimate the model using a Two-Stage Least Squares setting -thereby treating our baseline 
model as a linear probability one-, diagnostics for under (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic), 
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weak (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic) and over-identification (Hansen J) pass the 
recommended thresholds for both variables of interest10. The results in Table 7 remain the same 
for all the specifications estimated in earlier sections (i.e. further controls and sub-samples).11 
 
   [Insert Table 7 Around Here] 
 
5. Conclusions  
This study aims to extend our knowledge on the driving factors of collateral in corporate 
borrowing. Within this context, we use a sample of over 17,500 firms from more than 100 
developing countries to investigate the role of a country’s social capital and perceptions on 
corporate ethical behaviour on collateral requirements.  
The empirical results are consistent with our expectations. We find that country-level 
social capital and better perceptions on corporate ethical behaviour are negatively associated 
with the likelihood to pledge collateral. Further analysis reveals that these country-level 
characteristics influence not only the likelihood to pledge collateral, but also its value relative 
to the loan value. These results hold while controlling for various firm-specific and country-
specific characteristics, as well as when we use instrumental analysis to mitigate endogeneity 
concerns.  
This study has various implications. The most important is that the ethical behaviour of 
firms can have beneficial outcomes in the form of lower collateral requirements during 
borrowing. This is of great value for firm managers and owners since the absence of collateral 
restricts firm entry and post-entry growth, an issue that is amplified in the case of SMEs, young 
firms and in transition countries (Schmalz et al., 2017; Abraham and Schmukler, 2017; Love 
                                                 
10 It is worth mentioning that although the 2SLS approach disregards the binary nature of the dependent variable, 
it remains an option which is viable and less complex, as pointed out by Angrist and Pischke (2008). 
11 To conserve space, we do not report all the specifications. All the results are available from the authors upon 
request.  
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et al., 2016; Moreno-Badia and Slootmaekers 2009). These results have possibly implications 
that go beyond collateral requirements, extending to the bank-firm relationships in general. 
However, as discussed in Bews and Rossouw (2002), “trust is not simply a given, but something 
that can be earned by managers” (p. 385). Therefore, firms should invest on an ethical 
behaviour that will result in trustworthiness and will benefit their bank-firm relationships. For 
example, Bews and Rossouw (2002), propose various ethical interventions that can make a 
significant contribution in promoting ethics and trust like the adoption of an ethical code, trust-
training, procedural transparency, etc. The adoption of such ethical related policies is 
undoubtedly necessary, but it may not play a role as an intangible asset, unless it is 
appropriately communicated. The main purpose of this communication should be to strengthen 
the connection between the firm and its stakeholders, including of course its bank and the wider 
social community.  This brings us to our second contribution that relates to an emerging strand 
of the literature that documents the role of social environment on economic behaviour. In a 
sense, we document that banks perceive social capital and perceptions about corporate ethical 
behaviour as environmental pressures that constrain opportunistic behaviour in corporate 
borrowing. Within this context, our study has also policy making implications. While it is 
difficult to impose regulations that have to do with deep-rooted social norms, policy makers 
could take steps to encourage the fostering of cooperative norms, social networks, and 
trustworthiness. Additionally, they could consider the role of the social environment, when 
designing collateral laws or introducing collateral registries.  
Our study has at least two weaknesses. First, the anonymity of firms in the database of 
the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey does not allow us to collect additional firm-level 
information and match it with our dataset. Second, our analysis focuses on transition and 
developing countries covered in the WBES. Thus, it is not possible to examine if the results 
differ across different levels of institutional and economic development. We hope that, as more 
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or different datasets will become available, future research will effectively deal with these 
issues. Future research could also be directed towards at least two more avenues. For example, 
the Legatum index of social capital that we use is an overall indicator aiming to capture all 
three types of social capital, namely bonding, bridging, linking. However, there are no sub-
indices for each of these dimensions. Subject to data availability future research could examine 
if the impact of social capital on collateral differs among the three types. Additionally, the 
corporate ethical behaviour perceptions and social capital that we use in the present study are 
at the country-level. Future research could collect firm level data, that would also allow one to 
examine how these attributes interact with other firm-level characteristics. At the same time, 
the acquisition of detailed firm-level data could also help in answering additional questions. 
For example, how should firms manage their investment in social capital, and to what extent 
does responsible behaviour create competitive advantages and power when negotiating with 
their lenders? Conducting such an investigation at a cross-country setting constitutes a large-
scale exercise that requires substantial resources, and it was not possible to pursue in this 
analysis. We hope that future research will improve upon this. 
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Table 1. Correlation coefficients of dependent variable and covariates  
 
 COLLATERAL SOCIAL ETHICS AGE EXPERIENCE ISO_CERTIFY SIZE GDPCAP CRINFO FINOP TRCREDIT FEMALE LCOST INSTIT CONC IDV UAI PDI 
COLLATERAL 1                  
SOCIAL -0.148*** 1                 
ETHICS -0.093*** 0.285*** 1                
AGE -0.078*** 0.174*** 0.053*** 1               
EXPERIENCE -0.058*** 0.086*** 0.025*** 0.301*** 1              
ISO_CERTIFY -0.029*** -0.025*** 0.058*** 0.161*** 0.0297*** 1             
SIZE 0.038*** -0.058*** 0.025*** 0.213*** 0.085*** 0.251*** 1            
GDPCAP -0.133*** 0.423*** 0.497*** 0.104*** 0.123*** 0.093*** 0.117*** 1           
CRINFO -0.196*** 0.296*** -0.101*** 0.165*** 0.189*** 0.058*** -0.191*** 0.149*** 1          
FINOP -0.074*** 0.110*** 0.112*** 0.139*** 0.097*** 0.084*** 0.165*** 0.112*** 0.129*** 1         
TRCREDIT -0.101*** 0.139*** 0.096*** 0.168*** 0.141*** 0.093*** 0.185*** 0.255*** 0.253*** 0.153*** 1        
FEMALE 0.024*** 0.015** -0.043*** -0.065*** -0.093*** -0.068*** -0.125*** -0.048*** -0.0082 -0.078*** -0.054*** 1       
LCOST -0.093 0.087*** 0.031*** -0.005 0.021*** -0.048*** -0.064*** 0.081*** 0.037*** -0.053*** -0.044*** 0.024*** 1      
INSTIT -0.123*** 0.426*** 0.629*** 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.059*** 0.067*** 0.61*** 0.109*** 0.136*** 0.162*** -0.018 0.076*** 1     
CONC 0.032*** 0.007 -0.045*** -0.045 0.029*** -0.021*** -0.088*** -0.099*** 0.138*** -0.014 0.004 -0.001 -0.023*** -0.125*** 1    
IDV 0.013 0.040*** 0.097*** 0.022*** 0.033*** 0.072*** 0.145*** 0.58*** -0.182*** 0.025*** 0.0072 -0.041*** 0.054*** 0.551*** -0.175*** 1   
UAI -0.121*** -0.054*** -0.025*** 0.095*** 0.144*** -0.058*** 0.047*** -0.023*** 0.249*** 0.109*** 0.192*** -0.023*** 0.043*** 0.140*** -0.189*** -0.176*** 1  
PDI 0.112*** -0.318*** -0.228*** -0.128*** -0.125*** -0.063*** -0.022*** -0.586*** -0.218*** -0.185*** -0.155*** 0.066*** -0.035*** -0.487*** 0.156*** -0.541*** 0.035 1 







For the variable description, see Table A.1 in the Appendix. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
COLLATERAL 20,013 0.73 0.44 0 1 
COLVALUE 12,070 37.78 63.42 0 200 
SOCIAL 712 47.70 5.31 27 62 
ETHICS 469 3.82 0.65 2.55 6.78 
AGE 20,013 21.45 19.18 0 309 
EXPERIENCE 20,013 20.83 11.55 0 70 
ISO_CERTIFY 20,013 0.25 0.43 0 1 
MED-SIZE 20,013 0.38 0.49 0 1 
LARGE-SIZE 20,013 0.26 0.44 0 1 
GDPCAP 712 6,126 7,885 307 53,562 
CRINFO 712 2.73 2.69 0 8 
FINOP 19,857 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 
TRCREDIT 14,710 56.49 36.64 0 100 
FEMALE 13,877 0.14 0.35 0 1 
LCOST 16,656 0.21 0.18 0.00 0.87 
INSTIT 702 -0.27 0.71 -1.78 2.06 
CONC 706 12.14 8.03 -0.24 53.74 
IDV 423 33.48 18.65 6 80 
UAI 423 68.21 19.92 13 99 
PDI 423 46.30 19.75 5 100 



















Notes: For the variable description, see Table A.1 in the Appendix. Descriptive statistics for the country-level variables are 
calculated from country-level (and not firm-level) observations to avoid double-counting. 
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Table 3. Baseline results  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio 
SOCIAL 0.973*** 0.972*** 0.980*** 0.988*** 0.966*** 0.979***             
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)             
ETHICS             0.748*** 0.753*** 0.800*** 0.800*** 0.758*** 0.813*** 
              (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.034) 
AGE 0.998** 0.998** 0.997*** 0.996*** 0.998** 0.996*** 0.997*** 0.997*** 0.997** 0.997** 0.996*** 0.997** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EXPERIENCE 1.002 1.002 1.003 1.001 1.005*** 1.006*** 1.002 1.002 1.004* 1.002 1.005** 1.007*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ISO_CERTIFY 0.867*** 0.873*** 0.902** 0.922* 0.851*** 0.907* 0.884*** 0.891** 0.894** 0.899** 0.883** 0.892* 
  (0.036) (0.037) (0.043) (0.045) (0.039) (0.051) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.052) 
MED-SIZE 1.410*** 1.438*** 1.507*** 1.491*** 1.418*** 1.542*** 1.459*** 1.490*** 1.555*** 1.580*** 1.450*** 1.602*** 
  (0.057) (0.059) (0.072) (0.072) (0.064) (0.087) (0.068) (0.070) (0.079) (0.081) (0.075) (0.096) 
LARGE-SIZE 1.345*** 1.392*** 1.439*** 1.380*** 1.355*** 1.454*** 1.431*** 1.481*** 1.473*** 1.450*** 1.425*** 1.478*** 
  (0.064) (0.067) (0.079) (0.078) (0.071) (0.095) (0.077) (0.081) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.102) 
GDPCAP 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CRINFO 0.881*** 0.883*** 0.885*** 0.876*** 0.886*** 0.894*** 0.882*** 0.884*** 0.887*** 0.881*** 0.890*** 0.890*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) 
FINOP   0.822***       0.809***   0.833***       0.904 
    (0.035)       (0.046)   (0.040)       (0.056) 
TRCREDIT     0.998***     0.999*     0.999     1.000 
      (0.006)     (0.0007)     (0.007)     (0.001) 
FEMALE       1.174***   1.157**       1.145**   1.128* 
        (0.070)   (0.080)       (0.072)   (0.082) 
LCOST         1.209* 1.387**         1.187 1.361** 
          (0.131) (0.185)         (0.146) (0.195) 
Constant 19.89*** 22.67*** 13.26*** 5.518*** 27.48*** 8.896*** 19.44*** 20.74*** 16.21*** 15.80*** 16.02*** 10.42*** 
  (6.171) (7.093) (4.393) (1.965) (9.535) (3.619) (3.369) (3.641) (3.213) (3.756) (3.059) (2.722) 
Observations 20,013 19,857 14,710 13,877 16,656 10,732 15,194 15,082 12,984 12,492 12,547 9,726 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Regional Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0689 0.0701 0.0630 0.0595 0.0718 0.0668 0.0719 0.0728 0.0781 0.0736 0.0736 0.0803 
 
 
Notes: Results of the Logistic Regression Model described in Equation (1) enhanced to control for: (i) the financial openness ‘FINOP’, (ii) trade credit ‘TRCREDIT’, (iii) 
presence of females among the owners of the firm ‘FEMALE’ (iv) labour cost to revenues ‘LCOST’. For the variable description, see Table A.1 in the Appendix. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  Note: Odds ratios -computed as 𝑒𝛽, where β is the coefficient of a covariate- represent 
the constant effect of a predictor X, on the likelihood that an outcome (i.e. hereby pledging for collateral) will occur. 
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Table 4. Controlling for bank concentration, institutional development and national culture 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio 
 
SOCIAL 0.969*** 0.985** 0.943*** 0.960***         
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)         
ETHICS         0.753*** 0.799*** 0.700*** 0.830** 
          (0.026) (0.037) (0.031) (0.065) 
AGE 0.999 0.998** 0.998** 0.998** 0.997*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EXPERIENCE 1.002 1.002 1.003** 1.003* 1.002 1.002 1.005** 1.004** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ISO_CERTIFY 0.878*** 0.856*** 0.879*** 0.889** 0.903** 0.880*** 0.931 0.946 
  (0.038) (0.036) (0.040) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.047) (0.049) 
MED-SIZE 1.416*** 1.406*** 1.451*** 1.442*** 1.466*** 1.452*** 1.449*** 1.437*** 
  (0.059) (0.057) (0.064) (0.066) (0.069) (0.068) (0.074) (0.075) 
LARGE-SIZE 1.348*** 1.345*** 1.411*** 1.395*** 1.442*** 1.430*** 1.465*** 1.454*** 
  (0.066) (0.064) (0.073) (0.075) (0.080) (0.078) (0.087) (0.089) 
GDPCAP 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000* 1.000 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000** 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CRINFO 0.871*** 0.891*** 0.921*** 0.893*** 0.873*** 0.882*** 0.924*** 0.908*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019) 
CONC 1.030***     1.023*** 1.025***     1.019*** 
  (0.003)     (0.003) (0.003)     (0.003) 
INSTIT   0.690***   0.746***   0.882**   0.846** 
    (0.024)   (0.034)   (0.053)   (0.072) 
INDIV     1.004 1.001     1.001 1.000 
      (0.002) (0.002)     (0.003) (0.003) 
UAI     0.984*** 0.992***     0.980*** 0.986*** 
      (0.002) (0.002)     (0.002) (0.002) 
MASC     0.997* 0.995***     0.994*** 0.996* 
      (0.002) (0.002)     (0.002) (0.002) 
PDI     1.015*** 1.006**     1.012*** 1.006* 
      (0.003) (0.003)     (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.063*** 0.103*** 0.010*** 0.027*** 0.0680*** 0.071*** 0.022*** 0.054*** 
  (0.020) (0.033) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.008) (0.026) 
                  
Observations 19,438 19,762 15,705 14,903 14,683 14,936 11,975 11,232 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Regional Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 












Notes: Results of the Logistic Regression Model described in Eq. (1) including: (i) Bank concentration ratio ‘CONC’, (ii) institutional 
development ‘INSTIT’ and (iii) national culture (INDIV, UAI, MASC, PDI). For the variable description, see Table A.1 in the Appendix.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  Note: Odds ratios -computed as 𝑒𝛽, where β is 
the coefficient of a covariate- represent the constant effect of a predictor X, on the likelihood that an outcome (i.e. hereby pledging for 




Table 5. Baseline model over sub-samples 
  Excl. GFC Small firms only Medium firms only Large firms only Private banks only 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio 
                      
SOCIAL 0.963***   0.984**   0.963***   0.967***   0.971***   
  (0.006)   (0.008)   (0.010)   (0.012)   (0.006)   
ETHICS   0.752***   0.781***   0.795***   0.695***   0.752*** 
    (0.032)   (0.048)   (0.045)   (0.044)   (0.028) 
AGE 0.999 0.997*** 1.004* 1.000 1.002 1.003 0.995*** 0.993*** 0.998** 0.996*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
EXPERIENCE 1.002 1.003 0.995 0.998 1.002 1.000 1.005* 1.003 1.002 1.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
ISO_CERTIFY 0.868*** 0.887** 1.101 0.997 0.981 1.013 0.683*** 0.741*** 0.850*** 0.867*** 
  (0.041) (0.048) (0.104) (0.100) (0.068) (0.077) (0.047) (0.058) (0.038) (0.043) 
MED-SIZE 1.383*** 1.431***             1.451*** 1.515*** 
  (0.063) (0.077)             (0.064) (0.077) 
LARGE-SIZE 1.260*** 1.348***             1.393*** 1.485*** 
  (0.067) (0.084)             (0.071) (0.086) 
GDPCAP 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CRINFO 0.883*** 0.888*** 0.861*** 0.871*** 0.882*** 0.880*** 0.922*** 0.908*** 0.865*** 0.851*** 
  (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.027) (0.030) (0.013) (0.015) 
Constant 0.028*** 0.0473*** 0.0605*** 0.0433*** 0.038*** 0.070*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.028) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) 
                      
Observations 15,678 11,323 7,094 5,375 7,634 5,736 5,285 4,083 17,097 13,026 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Regional Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 





Notes: Results of the Logistic Regression Model described in Eq. (1): (i) Excluding 2007-2010 (Columns 1 & 2), including (ii) Small firms only (Columns 3 & 4), medium firms only (Columns 5&6) and large firms 
(Columns 7 & 8), (iii) loans granted only by private banks. For the variable description, see Table A.1 in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  Note: 
Odds ratios -computed as 𝑒𝛽, where β is the coefficient of a covariate- represent the constant effect of a predictor X, on the likelihood that an outcome (i.e. hereby pledging for collateral) will occur. 
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Table 6. Tobit Model regarding the level of collateral pledged by the firm 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES model model 
   
SOCIAL -13.09***  
 (0.699)  
ETHICS  -24.99*** 
  (8.144) 
AGE 0.001 -0.267 
 (0.105) (0.260) 
EXPERIENCE 0.0310 0.164 
 (0.183) (0.397) 
ISO_CERTIFY -23.94*** -15.27 
 (4.912) (11.57) 
GDPCAP -0.001 -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
CRINFO 1.039 -8.799 
 (1.166) (6.554) 
MED-SIZE 10.80* 3.314 
 (5.726) (10.29) 
LARGE-SIZE 10.65* 8.797 
 (5.740) (12.75) 
   
Constant 730.9*** 120.5*** 
 (30.93) (39.48) 
   
Observations 12,070 7,084 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
Regional Dummies YES YES 















Notes: Results of the Tobit model (left 
censored at 0). Firms not pledging collateral 
receive a value of ‘0’. For the variable 
description, see Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
clustered by firm. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1 (i.e. hereby pledging for collateral) 
will occur. 
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Table 7. Alleviating Endogeneity: Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) 
 
  (1) (2) 



















AGE 0.999 0.997*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
EXPERIENCE 1.002 1.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
ISO_CERTIFY 0.866*** 0.886** 
  (0.037) (0.043) 
MED-SIZE 1.416*** 1.485*** 
  (0.060) (0.071) 
LARGE-SIZE 1.332*** 1.439*** 
  (0.066) (0.080) 
GDPCAP 1.000 1.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
CRINFO 0.867*** 0.908*** 
  (0.016) (0.015) 
Constant 0.002*** 0.020*** 
  (0.003) (0.009) 
  
  
Observations 18,979 14,275 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
Regional Dummies YES YES 
R-squared 0.0713 0.0788 
   
First Stage Output:   
Agricultural potential 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Genetic Diversity  15.200*** 2.046*** 
  (1.046) (0.087) 
Latitude -0.165*** -0.012*** 
  (0.00191) (0.000194) 
  
  
Other exogenous YES YES 
R-squared 0.5459 0.4868 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Notes: Results of the 2SRI model. First stage instruments are the 
predicted genetic diversity (ancestry adjusted), absolute value of the 
latitudinal distance from equator and agricultural potential (see 
section 4.3 for a detailed discussion). For the variable description, 
see Table A.1 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered by firm. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
(i.e. hereby pledging for collateral) will occur. 
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Table A.1. Variable Description 
 
Variable Description  Source 









Reflects the strength of personal and social relationships, social 





Denotes the WEF’s survey on leaders’ views on how ethical 
corporations behave in a country and takes values from 1 to 7, with 
higher figures indicating higher ethical behavior and vice versa. 
World Economic Forum 











Dummy variable on whether a firm has internationally-recognized 
quality certification (e.g. ISO 9000, ISO 9002). WBES 
 
MED-SIZE 
Dummy variable that takes the value of ‘1’ whether a firm is a 
medium -sized firm and ‘0’ otherwise. WBES 
 
LARGE-SIZE 
Dummy variable that takes the value of ‘1’ whether a firm is a large 
-sized firm and ‘0’ otherwise. WBES 
 
FEMALE 





This variable may take the value of zero in the case of firms with no 
checking/savings account or overdraft, the value of one in the case 
of firms that have either checking/savings account or overdraft, and 
the value of two in the case where a firm has both checking/savings 









Using the percentage of the material inputs or services that were 




Per capita gross domestic product based on purchasing power parity 
(PPP).  
World Development Indicators 
 
CRINFO 
Index where higher values indicate the availability of more credit 
information, from either a public registry or a private bureau, to 
facilitate lending decisions. 
Doing Business Project 
CONC 
proportion of assets held by the three largest commercial banks in a 
country. Higher figures indicate that only a few banks dominate in 
the market, and hence there is a lower degree of competition. 





Index calculated as the average of the following three indicators: 
regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption. Higher figures 
denote better outcomes. 
World Governance Indicators 
 
 













MASC Masculinity index. Hofstede Insights 
Agricultural potential 
 
Mean potential caloric yield attainable given the set of crops that 
were suitable for cultivation in the post-1500 period. 




Ancestry adjusted predicted genetic diversity, estimated on the basis 
of migratory distance from East Africa. 
Ashraf and Galor (2013) 
 
 
Latitude The absolute value of the latitudinal distance from equator. 
Ashraf and Galor (2013) 
 
 
